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FOREWORD
BIOETHICS AT THE BEGINNING, MIDDLE,
AND END OF LIFE
ELIZABETH M. ANDERSON*
INTRODUCTION
Bioethical rhetoric that pervades American discourse today
began at a time when the problems associated with technologies
such as embryonic stem cell research and cloning were
unimaginable. Issues in biological sciences were first spurred in
large part by the effort to improve military medicine after World
War 11.1 At that time, penicillin, which had been discovered in
1928 and was first applied clinically during the war, had begun to
be produced synthetically. The ease and low cost of synthetic
production made penicillin the preferred drug for treating pneu-
monia and other infections. Further developments led to the
introduction of cancer treatments, anti-hypertensive drugs, the
cardiac pacemaker, and the polio vaccine. With this increased
progress of medicine came the development of medical special-
ties, and with such development came concern regarding the
damage these specialties would have on the relationship between
patients and the traditional general-practice physician. Thus was
born one of the first significant bioethical issues.' Nevertheless,
this and other growing issues of the time, such as the increasing
use of human subjects for medical research and the rising costs
of health care, were infrequently discussed with those outside the
medical field.4
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1. ALBERTJONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 12 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 12-13.
2 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
As medical technology continued to advance, however, so
did the scope of the bioethics dialogue. By the 1960s, those
outside the medical field began discussing bioethical issues.
Both human cloning and embryo research became topics of dis-
cussion in many circles after the successful cloning of tadpoles in
1962 and the birth of the first human "test-tube baby" in 1978.'
While these events became topics of discussion in academic cir-
cles, early works discussing bioethics still did not have much
impact on the media or on public opinion.6 Not until years later,
when the public began to take a personal stake in decisions
regarding abortion, euthanasia, neonatal infanticide, and the
refusal of life-prolonging technology, did members of the gen-
eral public begin to find bioethical issues of interest.
The incredible, and almost unimaginable, technological
advances of the past quarter century have brought issues in bio-
ethics to the forefront of public attention. These advances have
already provided remarkable enhancements for human life, and
they hold the potential for even more improvements. Unfortu-
nately, this accelerated pace of scientific advancement has hin-
dered the ability of our cultural values and laws, in many cases, to
deal adequately with the opportunities and dangers such devel-
opments present. Science continues to develop at a pace that
exceeds the pace of public debate and political action. Conse-
quently, the basic moral questions remain: Are we in some cases
treating human life as raw material to be exploited as a natural
resource? Have we blurred the line between creation and manu-
facture? What moral boundaries should researchers observe?
7
To determine the future direction of the development of
biotechnology requires a deep understanding of the ethical
issues involved-on the part of both the general public and of
members of the legal profession. For the general public, bio-
technology, and the bioethics that can govern how we decide to
use that technology, affects many aspects of people's lives. Bio-
ethical decisions can affect the way people bear their children,
the way they are treated for disease or disability, the way their
5. LEON KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY 81 (2002).
6. This can be demonstrated by the way bioethical publications were
received in the public. For example, one early leading book in bioethics, ETH-
ICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS, written by Paul
Ramsey in 1978, did not have much of an impact on the public. James J.
McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life: Philosophical
and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REV. 597, 597 (2002). One possible reason for
this is that, at the time, "many people would have just as soon avoid discussing
issues that concern life and death." Id.
7. KAss, supra note 5, at 82.
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physical characteristics are used by government officials in crime
investigation, and how they spend the last moments of their lives.
The ethical concerns regarding biotechnology can affect how
these types of actions are regulated when such concerns are
relayed to lawmakers. Consequently, a broad understanding of
bioethical issues that relate to the regulation of biotechnology
can help to ensure that medical advancements are not made in
an unethical or immoral manner.
For those in the legal profession, bioethical-related decisions
can pervade their professional lives. Unfortunately, however, the
area of bioethics is one with which many lawyers, judges, and
lawmakers do not often have significant experience or education
because it is a relatively new area of study and is one that was not
taught in any law school just a few years ago.' As the area of
biotechnology and law continues to grow, however, a practicing
attorney cannot escape facing bioethical issues on a regular basis:
Do I defend a husband's right to have the frozen embryos of his
and his widow's destroyed after her death? Do I defend a pre-
scribing physician who has encouraged a patient to take experi-
mental treatments for which he has received a financial
incentive? Do I advocate for a couple to clone their child for
"spare parts?" In each of these situations, the benefits of medical
advances to a larger population can often persuade others to
ignore or lessen the emphasis of the ethical impact of such
actions.
Despite its benefits, however, the development of biotech-
nology has moral limits that conform to specific moral abso-
lutes,9 as an ethical approach to the development of
biotechnology should remain grounded in certain fundamental
truths about the human person. First among these truths is "the
dignity or value of each human person at every stage and condi-
tion."'" The revelation of our likeness to and relationship with
God affirmatively attests to this truth."l Pope John Paul II's
encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, illustrates why the human person is
an entity of incomparable dignity." In the encyclical, Pope John
8. Robert A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 945, 951
(1991).
9. SeeJOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 6
(1991).
10. THE CTR. FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, CUTTING-EDGE BIOETH-
ics: A CHRISTIAN EXPLORATION OF TECHNOLOGIES AND TRENDS 97 (John F. Kilne
et al. eds., 2002).
11. Id.
12. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE, http://wvv.vatican.va/holy_
father/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-ii-enc_25031995_
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Paul notes the threat to the weakest members of the human
race-the unborn, the sick, and the dying."3 Most importantly,
his Holiness makes an impassioned plea to all people of goodwill
to recognize the dignity and sanctity of human life, to defend it
from attacks launched against it, and to love it as a precious gift
from God. 4 In this light, acts that manipulate, marginalize, or
kill human persons in any phase or condition are grave offenses
that should be proscribed by civil law in a civilized society.
While scientific research and development can lead to
improving lives by helping scientists to discover cures for diseases
and disabilities, these developments often involve the destruction
or modification of human life. In this way, such developments
can violate the dignity of the human person, thus creating a ten-
sion between the need for advancing biotechnology and preserv-
ing human dignity. This inherent tension must be resolved in a
way that maintains the dignity of every human person while
allowing science to improve the quality of lives to whatever extent
possible within these limits. Consequently, the developers and
utilizers of biotechnology must observe certain moral limits. The
moral limits of medical advancement addressed in this sympo-
sium concern such bioethical matters that surface at the begin-
ning, middle, and end of life.
I. THE BEGINNING OF LIFE-WHEN THE
DIGNITY REQUIREMENT BEGINS
There may be no more pressing area of bioethics than the
ethics surrounding the creation of life. Ethical issues surfacing at
the beginning of life include those involving human cloning,
embryonic stem cell research, and genetic manipulation. To
address these issues is to address the eternal question: When
does life begin? Many individuals believe that human life begins
at conception and others find that a blastocyst, a human in the
earliest stage of development, does not become a human being
until it looks like a human being and can do some of what
human beings do. 5 How one defines the beginning of life has a
large impact on how one views the ethics of actions such as abor-
tion and embryonic stem cell research. For instance, if a human
being becomes such at the moment of conception, the human
evangelium-vitaeen.html (Mar. 25, 1995) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See KAss, supra note 5, at 88 (arguing that blastocysts are not human
beings because they do not look human or act human, though recognizing that
the blastocyst is potentially a human being).
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embryo that later develops must "be defended in its integrity,
tended and cared for, to the extent possible, in the same way as
any other human being ....,16 Today, "[m] odern science recog-
nizes that the biological identity of a new human individual is
already constituted in the zygote resulting from fertilization.""
If one accepts this proposition, then the dignity of a human must
be respected from this first moment of existence.
The issue of human dignity as it relates to embryonic stem
cell research is addressed in Roger Brownsword's article, Bioethics
Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the "Dignitarian
Alliance. "18 Professor Brownsword notes that the Dignitarian Alli-
ance focuses on the inherent dignity and worth of human
beings-a dignity that should not be violated by any scientific or
other endeavor. In his article, Professor Brownsword argues that
"human dignity is an extremely powerful idea and it is likely to
seem even more important as technology races ahead to redefine
what we hitherto took to be the limits of human finitude."' 1 Pro-
fessor Brownsword argues that the dignitarian approach is vital
to give voice to our correct gut reaction toward certain
biotechnological pursuits-such as embryonic stem cell research.
He then critiques the government policy toward stem cell
research in the United Kingdom, arguing that human embryos
should be treated with a sort of reverence that is contrary to the
government's policy. Because the government, while allowing
stem cell research, notes that it ought to be conducted as little as
possible and that existing embryos should be used instead of cre-
ating new ones, Brownsword questions how the government can
recognize in its policy-making that human embryos should be
treated differently yet continue to allow embryonic research.
Similarly, Senator Rick Santorum addresses the ethical
implications of embryonic stem cell research on human dignity
in his essay, The New Culture of Life: Promoting Responsible and
Appropriate Medical Research.2 ° Senator Santorum admonishes the
use of government funding for scientific research that involves
16. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DONUM VITAE,
http://www.cin.org/vatcong/donumvit.html (Feb. 22, 1987) (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
17. WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE GIFr OF HUMAN LIFE
35 (2000).
18. Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell
Research and the "Dignitarian Alliance", 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
15 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Rick Santorum, Essay, The New Culture of Life: Promoting Responsible and
Appropriate Medical Research, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'' 151
(2003).
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the destruction of human embryos or that is based on the prior
destruction of human life. The essay notes the history of
instances-including the notable Nuremberg war crime trials-
in which humankind has paused to consider certain ethical
boundaries that should govern scientific research. Noting that
the manufacture and destruction of human embryos for the sole
purpose of scientific inquiry is immoral, the essay encourages
policymakers to reconsider the issue of embryonic stem cell
research and seek a policy framework that will protect and
enhance human dignity.
In addition to embryonic stem cell research, human cloning
is an issue in bioethics that, while it first gained wide attention
several years ago, remains an issue of significant public attention.
From the announcement that the first animal was cloned in 1997
in Edinburgh, Scotland 2 ' to the declaration in 2001 that
Advanced Cell Technology (ACT), a small biotech firm in Massa-
chusetts, had succeeded in creating the first human embryonic
clone,2 2 developments in cloning and the unresolved ethical
issues surrounding the technology keep the issue in public
debate. As of today, human cloning remains substantially unreg-
ulated despite significant efforts to the contrary, including the
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001,23 which passed by vote
in the House of Representatives but failed in the Senate in
August of that year.
In an effort to encourage the regulation of human cloning,
Shawn Peterson's note, A Comprehensive National Policy to Stop
Human Cloning: An Analysis of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of
2001 with Recommendations for Federal and State Legislatures,24 pro-
poses that the federal governmentjoin other nations in the inter-
national community that have attempted to ban human cloning.
The Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 (HCPA), the note
suggests, would be an effective first step toward such an
endeavor. Nevertheless, Congress should make several amend-
ments to the proposed ban to increase its effectiveness, including
"instilling friendly rules of construction, giving HHS interpretive
authority over the scientific subsections of the statute, creating its
21. Rick Weiss, Scottish Scientists Clone Adult Sheep; Technique's Use With
Humans is Feared, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al.
22. Joannie Fischer, The First Clone, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 25,
2001, at 51, 52.
23. Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
24. Shawn E. Peterson, Note, A Comprehensive National Policy to Stop Human
Cloning: An Analysis of the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 with Recommenda-
tions for Federal and State Legislatures, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
217 (2003).
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own expressed statute of limitations, and adding its own conspir-
acy and solicitation charge."2 Despite possible arguments that
the Act could infringe on an individual's right to create a child,
the note concludes that the HCPA is nevertheless constitutional
because the United States Supreme Court has not recognized
such a right. In addition, Mr. Peterson suggests actions for state
governments including: 1) passing a similar ban on human clon-
ing to allow state officials to enforce the ban and to police clon-
ing in their respective states; and 2) passing acts prohibiting the
destruction of embryos for research purposes to give further dis-
incentives for researchers to clone embryos within their bor-
ders.2 6 The note concludes that if Congress and its state
counterparts have the courage to take the steps necessary to
enact the HCPA and similar state acts, we will be able to stop the
practice of human cloning in the United States.
Elaborating on the ethical implications of the mistreatment
of human embryos in his article, Creating Clones, Kids & Chimera:
Liberal Democratic Compromise at the Crossroads,2 7 Nathan Adams
addresses three areas of biotechnology that have ethical implica-
tions surfacing at the beginning of life-human cloning, genetic
screening, and genetic engineering. Dr. Adams argues that bio-
technology may lead to a more radical transformation of the
political economy than any previous cluster of innovations
because biotechnology alone holds the ability to modify the
human species. The article makes a set of policy recommenda-
tions regarding manipulating the ex vivo living human embryo,
arguing that "[t]o extend no civil rights to the living human
embryo, but [to] treat it as the moral and legal equivalent of a
thing to be produced, patented, priced, and purchased would
substantially extend utilitarianism beyond its current foothold in
medical science. "28 Consequently, the article concludes, the best
solution is to extend the liberal democratic compromise regard-
ing Equal Protection, reproductive rights, the First Amendment,
human subject experimentation, patent law, and parental rights,
to ban or monopolize certain biotechnologies and extend sub-
stantial respect to the living human embryo.
25. Id. at 267.
26. Id. at 267-68
27. Nathan A. Adams, IV, Creating Clones, Kids & Chimera: Liberal Demo-
cratic Compromise at the Crossroads, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 71
(2003).
28. Id. at 147.
8 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
II. DURING LIFE-DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
During the course of a human life, several bioethical issues
can arise that require attention-including the use of genetic
profiling in the criminal justice system, the ability to receive
informed consent during human subject research, and the
proper method of legislating medical research and in forming
public policy regarding biotechnology. In August of 2001, Presi-
dent Bush announced the formation of the President's Council
of Bioethics, chaired by Dr. Leon Kass, to address some of these
issues. 2  Members of the Council included scientists, research-
ers, doctors, ethicists, theologians, and law professors, who were
brought together to advise the President regarding bioethical
policy-making. Specifically, the Council was formed "to monitor
stem cell research, to recommend appropriate guidelines and
regulations, and to consider all of the medical and ethical ramifi-
cations of biomedical innovation."' Backed by members of the
Council, President Bush urged Congress, in April of 2002, to sup-
port a ban on human cloning, stating, "Life is a creation, not a
commodity."'" To conform to this idea that life should not be
treated as a commodity, lawmakers should refrain from allowing
human beings to be treated as such during their lifetimes
through the use of biotechnology. Similarly, scientists should
refrain from engaging in acts that abrogate the dignity of a per-
son during his lifetime.
Inherent in the respect for the dignity of a human person is
respect for the autonomous choices for other persons. Although
"[r]espect for the autonomous choices of other persons runs as
deep in common morality as any principle, . . . little agreement
exists about its nature and strength or about specific rights of
autonomy. '32 The concept of autonomy has special applications
in the area of health care, as a patient's ability to give informed
consent to medical procedures is vital to retaining an individual's
autonomy and likewise, an individual's inherent dignity. The
29. Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001).
30. LEON R. KASS, THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CHAIRMAN'S
VISION, http://www.bioethics.gov/chairman.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003)
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). The
Council was formed to not only advise the President on issues related to
advances in biomedical science and technology, but also to provide a national
forum for a discussion of these issues. Id.
31. COUNTERCULTURE: CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM,
PRESIDENT BUSH CALLS ON SENATE TO BACK HUMAN CLONING BAN, http://
www.counterculture.org.uk/articles/presbush.htm (Apr. 10, 2002) (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
32. Tom L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 120 (4th ed. 1994).
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ethical issues surrounding the act of obtaining informed consent
when using human beings as research subjects are addressed in
Shannon Benbow's note, Conflict + Interest: Financial Incentives and
Informed Consent in Human Subject Research." Ms. Benbow
introduces the conflict of interest that arises when physicians
receive incentives from drug companies to prescribe the compa-
nies' drugs to their patients, highlighting this problem in the
context of pharmaceutical research. Applying this conflict of
interest to the doctrine of informed consent, the note raises the
question of whether patients can provide informed consent when
treating physicians do not adequately disclose their financial
interests in such research. Though financial conflicts may never
be fully eliminated, the note concludes that regulatory safe-
guards and monitoring are necessary to ensure that a physician's
conflict does not result in damage to a patient's integrity and
autonomy.
Ethical issues in biotechnology involve not only maintaining
an individual's dignity during medical treatment, but also
respecting an individual's Constitutional rights of privacy and
due process. For example, the ethics of a genetics-based criminal
justice system is addressed in Lindsy Elkins' note, Five Foot Two
With Eyes of Blue: Physical Profiling and the Prospect of a Genetics-Based
Criminal Justice System.3 4 Ms. Elkins explores the current nation-
wide crisis in the criminal justice system as it relates to existing
DNA technology and presents the prosecutorial uses of such
technology. The note concludes that while a DNA-based profil-
ing system raises Equal Protection issues, such a system would
pass constitutional muster because no group of individuals is sin-
gled out for special treatment and no group is penalized because
of hostility toward a particular trait or race. Rather, the note sug-
gests, DNA profiling in crime investigations could correct dis-
criminatory tendencies while allowing law enforcement to locate
criminal perpetrators.
In the pursuit to determine the best course of biotechno-
logical advancement, many different voices strain to be heard.
As discussions regarding the appropriate direction pervade the
media, recognizing the appropriate weight that should be given
to different sources of opinion remains vital. In their essay, The
33. Shannon Benbow, Note, Conflict + Interest: Financial Incentives and
Informed Consent in Human Subject Research, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 181 (2003).
34. Lindsy A. Elkins, Note, Five Foot Two With Eyes of Blue: Physical Profiling
and the Prospect of a Genetics-Based Criminal Justice System, 17 NOTRE DAMIE J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 269 (2003).
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Appropriate Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 5 Mau-
reen and Samuel Condic argue that scientists ought not be thrust
into the spotlight and trusted above all others regarding impor-
tant issues in biotechnology. Dr and Mr. Condic note that opin-
ions and recommendations of scientific experts often contrast
vividly with the opinions of many Americans, and that the utility
of scientific opinions depends critically on the nature of the deci-
sion at hand and remains limited by the culture of science and
the personality traits of scientists.
III. THE END OF LIFE-MAINTAINING DIGNITY IN
THE FACE OF DEATH
At the end of a human life, ethical considerations become
prevalent just as in any other time. Issues developing at the end
of life concern the questions-when does, when should, and how
should-life end? Furthermore, an important question
remains-is a person ever morally justified in causing the death
of another? One might say that causing death is morally wrong
because the subject of the act loses a part of his autonomy, or
"the capacity to plan and choose a future." 6 Consequently, the
question arises-if a person desires death, is another person
causing harm to him by causing his death? The answer to this
question requires a recognition that the sanctity of human life,
even more than a person's autonomy, requires the kind of rever-
ence that prohibits any person from causing the death of
another. The Declaration on Euthanasia, promulgated by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, states, "nothing and
no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human
being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an
old person or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a per-
son who is dying."3  To violate this principle by assisting
another's suicide is a violation of divine law and an offence
against the dignity of the human person.
Murder could be the most direct assault on the sanctity of
human life, but can actions such as assisting suicide, or euthana-
sia, be morally distinguished from murder?38 Some distinguish
35. Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, Essay, The Appropriate Limits
of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL' 157 (2003).
36. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 32, at 236.
37. SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARA-
TION ON EUTHANASIA, http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/congregations/
cfaith/documents/rc concfaithdoc19800505_euthanasia en.html (May 5,
1980) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
38. KASS, supra note 5, at 236.
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the acts by specifying that euthanasia allows a person to "die with
dignity. '39 Such dignity, however, is not one that can be
demanded or claimed, as it is not owed.4" In his recent Encycli-
cal Letter, Evangelium Vitae, Pope John Paul II accuses contempo-
rary culture of adopting a Promethean attitude, "which leads
people to think that they can control life and death by taking the
decisions about them into their own hands."41 Death with dig-
nity, or living dignifiedly in the face of death, is not a matter of
pulling the plugs or taking poison.42 Rather, euthanasia to
achieve death with dignity is, at best, paradoxical, for "how can I
honor myself by making myself nothing?"43 To die with dignity is
to accept the course that we have been given, to die when our
times come to die and not when we have decided that our lives
should end.44
Although a majority of Americans support physician-assisted
suicide, public opinion polls during the last decade have shown a
decreasing willingness to sanction assisted suicide both morally
and legally.45 In 1990, when Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted Janet
Adkins' suicide,46 his action was preceded by a century of contro-
versy over the morality of assisted suicide and euthanasia.4"
Those favoring euthanasia have cited patient autonomy and the
importance of relieving suffering as reasons for allowing the
39. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 790 (1997) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (recognizing that there might "roughly" be a "right to die with
dignity" encompassing a right to physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia).
40. KAss, supra note 5, at 247.
41. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 12.
42. KASS, supra note 5, at 251.
43. Id.
44. Nevertheless, measures may be taken to prevent a person's suffering
despite the risk that the action may shorten the patient's life. For example, "it
is morally legitimate for health care providers to offer adequate analgesia to
patients in deep and unremitting pain so that they are spared profound and
unremitting pain, even if this would shorten their lives." ROBERT L. BARRY, THE
SANCTITY OF HUNIAN LIFE AND ITS PROTECTION 140 (2002).
45. A 1993 Harris Poll indicated that 73% were in favor of legalizing phy-
sician-assisted suicide; a 1997 poll indicated 68% agreed; in 2001 only 65%
thought physician-assisted suicide should be legal. HUMPHREY TAYLOR, HARRIS
INTERACrnrIVE, 2-1 MAJORITIES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RIGHTS TO BOTH EUTHANA-
SIA AND DocroR-AssiSTED SUICIDE, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_
poll/index.asp?PID=278 (Jan. 9, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
46. See Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al.
47. David Orentlicher, The Misperception that Bioethics and the Law Lag
Behind Advances in Biotechnology: A Response to Michael H. Shapiro, 33 IND. L. REv.
163, 166 (1999).
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act.48 In contrast, opponents of euthanasia have argued that
patient suffering can be relieved without resorting to euthanasia;
that legalizing euthanasia would undermine patient trust in phy-
sicians; that if euthanasia were legalized, the right to die would
become a duty to die; that patients could choose euthanasia in
cases when the physician was mistaken about their prognoses;
and that euthanasia could cause the disabled to be victimized by
those who feel burdened by their care.4 9
The immorality of physician-assisted suicide, however, does
not necessarily prevent the act from being illegal. Therefore, the
question remains-who should decide whether causing the
death of another in this way is illegal? In 1997, the United States
Supreme Court held, in two landmark cases, that individuals do
not have a Constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.5 ° In
his opinion in Glucksberg, ChiefJustice Renquist wrote, "Through-
out the nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society."'" Reflecting the
existence of the ongoing debate regarding physician-assisted sui-
cide, one state-Oregon-has differed from all others and
passed legislation permitting the act.5 2 In his article, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Federalism, Brian Bix acknowledges states'
rights to decide whether physician-assisted suicide will be permis-
sible in their respective states. 5 3 Professor Bix finds that the fed-
eral government has little power to limit states' abilities to
legalize physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, Professor Bix
notes that while some states might choose to legalize physician-
assisted suicide because it reflects the values of the states' citi-
zens, such allowance is permissible only if the spillover effects of
the allowance are minimized. The effect of allowing states to
determine their responses to this issue has been that all states,
except Oregon, have refrained from legalizing physician-assisted
suicide despite the organized effort to legalize it through legisla-
tion and the courts. 54 Consequently, the practice of physician-
48. See LINDA L. EMANUEL, REGULATING How WE DIE: THE ETHICAL, MEDI-
CAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE 23-28 (1998).
49. See id. at 28-35.
50. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).
51. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
52. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT.
§§ 127.800-127.897 (2001).
53. Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53 (2003).
54. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-127.897.
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assisted suicide remains, and rightly so, limited by state
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Most of the bioethics issues discussed today, and those dis-
cussed in this symposium, are not new issues. They are, however,
issues that have been, and continue to be, refined through the
course of public discussion. As debate continues and technology
develops, those who are interested in ethical issues in biotechnol-
ogy continue to find themselves in new territory. At the begin-
ning of life, difficult issues in bioethics, such as issues in
embryonic stem cell research and human cloning, surround the
question of when life begins. During a human life, bioethical
issues affect how a person is treated medically, as in cases involv-
ing informed consent by human research subjects, and extend to
how a person is treated by the government, as in the use of
genetic profiling to convict criminals. At the end of life, the diffi-
cult issues in bioethics, including the regulation of physician-
assisted suicide, surround the questions of how a human life
should end.
In all phases of human existence, we have a duty to respect
the dignity of the human person and to ensure that this dignity is
respected by others. Although advances in medical technology
can eventually help people to lead longer, and perhaps healthier,
lives, these advances should not come at the cost of the lives of
others. Nor should advances in medical technology be exercised
if such procedures violate the dignity of the person on whom
they are exercised. Rather, biotechnology should proceed at a
pace that ensures that the inherent dignity of the human person
is upheld while allowing science to improve the quality of lives.55
The moral limits of biological developments addressed in this
symposium add important arguments to the public discourse in
bioethics-allowing readers to better assess the ethical impacts of
advances in biotechnology.
55. FINNIS, supra note 9, at 106.

